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Statements – An Argument for the Possibility of 
Knowledge Growth 
 
 
Abstract: Karl Popper rightly contests the possibility of a verification of basic 
statements. At the same time he strictly believes in the possibility of growth of 
empirical knowledge. Knowledge growth, however, is only possible if empirical 
theories can be falsified. This raises the question, how theories can be falsified, 
if a verification of those statements that falsify theories – i.e. basic statements – 
is not possible. This problem is often referred to as the “basic problem” or “prob-
lem of the empirical basis”.  In this paper I show that – from a logical point of 
view – a falsification of theories is possible without a verification of basic state-
ments. Furthermore I show that knowledge growth in the empirical sciences will 
be possible if two assumptions are valid. These assumptions can neither be 
proven nor falsified. However, they have to be postulated by everybody in eve-
ryday life. 
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1. The rise of the basic problem 
 
Karl Popper contests the possibility of a verification of “basic statements”. “Ba-
sic statements” are “singular statements”, i.e. statements that relate an event 
with a certain spatio-temporal position.2 An example for such a basic statement 
is “At the spatio-temporal position (w, x, y, z) a black swan exists”.3 Popper ar-
gues that all such basic statements include abstract terms (“universals”), which 
include characteristics (“dispositions”) which transcend all observations. He il-
lustrates this argument with the following example:  
 
„Admittedly, if we say ‘All swans are white’, then the whiteness we predicate is 
an observable property; and to this extent, a singular statement such as ‘This 
swan here is white’ may be said to be based on observation. Yet it transcends 
experience – not because of the word ‘white’, but because of the word ‘swan’. 
For by calling something a ‘swan’, we attribute to it properties which go far be-
yond mere observation (…). Thus not only the more abstract explanatory theo-
ries transcend experience, but even the most ordinary singular statements. For 
even ordinary singular statements are always interpretations of ‘the facts’ in the 
light of theories. (And the same holds even for ‘the facts’ of the case. They con-
tain universals; and universals always entail a law-like behaviour.)” 4 
 
Since at least one basic statement that contradicts at least one empirical hy-
pothesis5 derived form an empirical theory is necessary to falsify this theory, the 
                                            
2 Synonymous expressions for „basic statement“ are „elementary statements“ (Reininger 
(1931), Metaphysik der Wirklichkeit, p. 134) and „protocol sentence“ (Neurath (1932), 
Soziologie, in Erkenntnis 2, p. 393). 
3 In this basic statement the “event” is the “existence of a black swan”. 
4 Popper (1980), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 423. Italics set by Popper. 
5 “Empirical hypotheses” are “strictly universal statements”, i.e. statements that relate an event 
to an unlimited number of spatio-temporal positions. An example for a strictly universal 
statement is the statement “All swans are white”, which is equivalent to “No matter what spa-
tio-temporal positions you check, you will never find a swan that is not white”. A Strictly uni-
versal statement is falsified by a basic statement which states the existence of an event, that 
is “forbidden” by the strictly universal statement. For example, if we are sure that the basic 
statement “At the spatio-temporal position (w, x, y, z) a black swan exists” is true, this will 
clearly falsify the strictly universal statement “All swans are white”. From the point of view of 
an empirical science, whose aim it is to evaluate empirical theories, falsifiability is a great 
advantage of strictly universal statements. Because there exists a law of logic (the so called 
“modus tollens”: [[t => hj] ∧ hj ] => t ]), which implies that the falseness of a statement al-
ways implies the falseness of at least one the axioms from which a statement is logically de-
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impossibility of a verification of basic statements seems to imply the impossibil-
ity of a falsification of an empirical theory. If however a falsification of empirical 
theories is not possible then by Humes’ problem of induction6 (which excludes 
the possibility of a verification of empirical theories) an evaluation of empirical 
theories will not be possible: Without the possibility of either falsification or veri-
fication of empirical theories it is not possible to determine whether theory A is 
better than theory B. Consequently, in this case a substitution of an empirical 
theory that contains a more falsified empirical hypotheses by an empirical the-
ory that contains less (or no) falsified empirical hypotheses – i.e. a growth of 
empirical knowledge – is not be possible. 
 
Popper proposes a conventionalist solution to this problem: He states that basic 
statements – even so they cannot be verified – are “inter-subjectively testable”. 
With relation to his example this means: It is not possible to verify that the or-
ganism at a certain spatio-temporal position is actually a “swan”. However it is 
possible to test, whether the organism displays certain characteristics, which 
are typical for the universal called “swan”. For example, it is possible to test, 
whether the organism displays the swan-specific relation between body-length, 
whether beak and feet display the swan-specific form, whether the organism 
                                                                                                                                
rived. Consequently, if a basic statement falsifies a strictly universal statement that is logi-
cally derived from a set of axioms of a certain theory, the theory itself is falsified – since at 
least one of its axioms must be false. So, in this case, the evaluation of the theory has led to 
a clear cut result: the theory is false. To show that an empirical theory is false is the only way 
to evaluate an empirical theory, because Humes’ problem of induction (see footnote 6) ex-
cludes the possibility to prove that an empirical theory is true (Popper (1980), The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, p. 27 f.). 
6 Following Humes’ problem of induction, even if a verification of basic statements were possi-
ble, it would not be possible to verify an empirical theory (Hume (1992), Treatise of Human 
Nature, p.90 f. and p. 138 f.). A simple proof of this (i.e. for the impossibility of induction) is 
given in the following: (1.) Assume an empirical hypothesis HA derived from theory A is not 
falsified by empirical observations. (2.) Assume a second theory B, from which two hypothe-
ses, HB1 and HB2 can be logically derived. (3.) Assume that hypothesis HB1 is identical to hy-
pothesis HA, while hypothesis HB2 cannot be derived from theory A. (4.) Furthermore, as-
sume hypothesis that HB2 is not falsified by empirical observations (and thereby falsifies the-
ory A). The logical consistency of these four assumptions implies the impossibility of a verifi-
cation of theory A by the fact that hypothesis HA is not falsified by empirical observations. 
Since, however, in every infinite universe (i.e. a universe that can not be completely de-
scribed by a finite amount of observations) it is not possible to exclude the possibility that for 
each theory, whose empirical hypotheses are not falsified by observations at date t, at least 
one other theory may be found at date t+x, which implies all the empirical hypotheses of the 
former theory plus additional (new) hypotheses, which are not falsified by observations (and 
hence imply a falsification of the old theory), it is in general not possible to verify a theory, 
whose empirical hypotheses are not falsified by observations at a certain point in time t. 
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posses a plumage and so on. The problem with these kinds of tests, so Popper, 
is that they can be infinitely continued. For, each of these characteristics (dispo-
sitions) can be disaggregated into further characteristics: In order to test, 
whether the organism possesses a plumage, it is necessary to check for the 
typical characteristics of plumes. This includes the typical density of a plumage 
as well as its structure and substance, which e.g. consists of beta keratin. Beta 
keratin can be analyzed whether it displays the typical chemical composition of 
beta keratin, which consists e.g. of a share of 25% of cystine in its amino acids. 
Cystine in turn can be analyzed whether its molecular composition consists of 
two molecules cysteine. These molecules again can be analyzed concerning 
their atomic composition etc. 
 
Following Popper it is possible to disaggregate the basic statement “At the spa-
tio-temporal position (w, x, y, z) a black swan exists” in an infinite class of fur-
ther basic statements. This “infinite regress” is a logical necessity according to 
Popper. It is what he means with his assertion that all basic statements “tran-
scend” experience. 
 
The only way out of this infinite regress is, according to Popper, “abort of test-
ing”. At what stage of testing the abort has to take place is determined by 
agreement between the observers: “Basic statements are accepted as the re-
sult of a decision or agreement; and to that extent they are conventions.”7 The 
“observers” are the members of the scientific community, which is concerned by 
the “agreement”. Popper writes on the possibility to come to an agreement in 
such a community (whose function he compares with that of a classical “trial by 
jury”): 
 
„It is fairly easy to see that we arrive this way at a procedure according to which 
we stop only at a kind of statement that is especially easy to test. For it means 
that we are stopping at statements about whose acceptance or rejection the 
various observers are likely to reach agreement. And if they do not agree, they 
will simply continue with the tests, or else start them all over again. If this too 
                                            
7 Popper, ibid, p. 106. 
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leads to no result, then we might say that the statements in question were not 
inter-subjectively testable, or that we were not, after all, dealing with observable 
events. If some day it should no longer be possible for scientific observers to 
reach agreement about basic statements this would amount to a failure of lan-
guage as a means of universal communication. It would amount to a new “Ba-
bel of Tongues”: scientific discovery would be reduced to absurdity. In this new 
Babel, the soaring edifice of science would soon lie in ruins.”8 
 
Popper’s conventionalist solution of the basic problem has the consequence 
that the acceptance of basic statements is the decision of a certain scientific 
community, living in a certain historic situation. Ideally this community draws its 
decision on the basis of rational arguments. However, it is of course possible 
that this community practises some kind of dogmatic or biased behaviour. In 
this case the acceptance of a basic statement (and probably the falsification of 
a new theory) would be false. Therefore Popper points out that the acceptance 
of a basic statement does not imply the establishment of an ultimate dogma: 
 
 “The basic statements at which we stop, which we decide to accept as satisfac-
tory, and as sufficiently tested, have admittedly the character of dogmas, but 
only in so far as we may desist from justifying them by further arguments (or by 
further tests). But this kind of dogmatism is innocuous since, should the need 
arise, these statements can easily be tested further.”9 
 
According to Popper, the acceptance of a basic statement by a scientific com-
munity has not to be ultimate. In a sense, this “weakens” the problem resulting 
from dogmatic or biased behaviour of scientific communities. It has however the 
consequence that theories can never be falsified with certainty: if the accep-
tance of basic statements is always preliminary, then of course the falsification 
of theories will be preliminary too. If however a falsification of theories is not 
possible, then a growth of empirical knowledge will not be possible too. This 
problem is often referred to as the “basic problem” or the “problem of the em-
pirical basis”. 
                                            
8 Popper, ibid, p. 106. 
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The basic problem arises because Popper assigns universals a kind of autono-
mous character. Universals like “swan”, “glass” or “water” are “interpretations of 
‘the facts’ in the light of theories”10, but the question, where the theories which 
interpret the facts come from, is left open by Popper. From a logical point of 
view this is the reason, why a certain scientific community has to interpret the 
facts and decide over the acceptance of a basic statement. 
 
2. The disappearance of the basic problem 
 
However, the basic problem will disappear, if we consider the fact that the uni-
versal “swan” has to be (either implicitly or explicitly) defined within a theory 
from which the empirical hypothesis “All swans are white” follows. If it were not 
possible to find the definition of the universal “swan” within this theory, it would 
not be clear what the empirical hypothesis “All swans are white” really means. A 
theory that does not define the universals that are used by the theory cannot be 
falsified – its empirical content is zero. Therefore, the “burden of definition” has 
to be carried by the theory itself – and not by a scientific community or a some-
how chosen “club of experts”. 
 
However, how is it possible to decide, whether the definitions of universals 
given by the theory actually refer to something we usually call “reality”? Is it not 
necessary to have a “club of experts” to draw at least this very important deci-
sion? I will argue in the following that it is not necessary. In order to do so, I will 
decompose the problem into two sub-problems:  
 
• First, how is it possible to prevent the infinite regress which is ac-
cording to Popper implied by the definition of universals? 
 
                                                                                                                                
9 Popper, ibid, p. 105. 
10 Popper, ibid, p. 423. 
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• Second, which minimal assumptions are necessary and sufficient to 
make sure that the observations of a human being refer to something 
that actually exists in reality? 
 
As it will turn out, the answer to the first question can be given on the basis of 
simple examples. The answer to the second question will show that only two 
assumptions are necessary to make sure that the observations of a human be-
ing refer to something that actually exists. These assumptions can neither be 
verified nor falsified, but everybody human being has to make these assump-
tions in his everyday life in order to survive. Furthermore, the alternatives to 
these assumptions can also neither be verified nor falsified. 
 
2.1. The avoidance of an infinite regress 
 
To the first question: How is it possible to prevent the infinite regress which is 
according to Popper implied by the definition of universals? An infinite regress 
will only evolve if universals are not defined by the theories under test. Popper’s 
implicit assumption is that they exist somehow “outside” of theories. In this point 
Popper is vague, because he nevertheless claims that universals are “interpre-
tations of ‘the facts’ in the light of theories”11. The question is, what theories? If it 
is not clear by what theories universals are defined by, it seems to be possible 
to disaggregate them into an endless chain (swan → plumage → beta keratin 
→  cystine  → cysteine  → …). If however the definition of universals belongs to 
the theory under test, then each such chain must necessarily come to an end. 
This point is indeed rather trivial: A well defined theory has always a closed 
form, i.e. it does not contain infinite chains of definitions for universals. 
 
It is important to see that this does not imply a somehow “arbitrary” interruption 
of a chain of definitions: Beside the possibility to define universals by disaggre-
gation into “subordinate” universals (“vertical definition”), there exists the possi-
bility to define universals by “interaction” (“horizontal definition”). For example, 
to define a certain chemical element it is not necessary to disaggregate it into its 
                                            
11 Popper, ibid, p. 423. 
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specific composition of subordinate universals like electron, proton and neutron. 
In many cases it is possible to identify a chemical element by its interaction with 
other chemical elements. And indeed, many practised chemical identification 
procedures are based on this kind “identification by interaction”. The following 
example shows that such a “horizontal definition” by interaction is unanimously 
possible from the logical point of view:  
 
Consider a chemical theory which implies the empirical hypothesis that an alloy 
of substance A, substance B and substance C results in the chemical element 
“gold”. To be testable, i.e. to contain “empirical content”, the theory must define 
the universals substance A, substance B, substance C and gold. Let us assume 
that the theory implies that these substances are the only one in the universe 
with the following colour reactions: substance A alloyed with substance B re-
sults in a substance with the colour blue, substance B alloyed with substance C 
results in a substance with the colour red, substance A alloyed with substance 
C results in a substance with the colour green and that gold displays the colour 
yellow. If the theory implies these colour reactions, then the three substances A, 
B, C can be unanimously defined by their interactions: If one alloys two sub-
stances and the result is a substance with the colour blue, then one of these 
two substances must be substance A and the other must be substance B. Con-
sequently, if one alloys one of the two substances with another substance 
(which has not to be identified yet) and a substance with the colour green re-
sults, then this one substance must be substance A. By this result the sub-
stances B and C are simultaneously identified too.  
 
This simple example shows that it is logically possible that the three substances 
unanimously identify themselves by their interactions. However this means that 
– from a logical point of view – the definition of universals does not necessarily 
result in an infinite regress. 
 
Based on this identification it is now possible to test the empirical hypothesis 
that an alloy of substance A, substance B and substance C results in the 
chemical element “gold”. If the test shows that an alloy of substances A, B and 
C displays the colour “yellow”, then the theory is (by Humes’ induction problem) 
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not verified but corroborated. It is important to see that the fact that the theory 
itself is not verified also implies that the basic statement, namely the description 
of the result of the experiment (“At a certain spatio-temporal position in labora-
tory w,x,y at point in time z, an alloy of substance A, B and C yields gold”), is 
not verified, since substance A, B and C are identified under the assumption 
that the theory is true. However, from the logical point of view this is no prob-
lem, if and only if we do not claim that the basic statement verifies the theory. 
 
If the test shows that the resulting alloy is not gold, then the theory is unani-
mously falsified. In this case it is of course not possible to state that the three 
identified substances are actually substance A, B and C, because this identifica-
tion was only possible under the assumption that the theory is true. All we can 
say is that, if we use the theory to interpret our observations (i.e. identify sub-
stances A, B, C on the basis of their interactions), these observations contradict 
an empirical hypothesis derived from the theory. In other words, the theory 
“leads to observations that contradict the theory”. Consequently, the theory 
must contain a contradiction. Consequently, the theory must be wrong. This 
clearly shows that it is possible to falsify a theory without a verification of basic 
statements.  
 
The example shows that in order to falsify a theory it is not necessary to have 
an unconditional basic statement of the type “At the spatio-temporal position (w, 
x, y, z) a black swan exists”, but simply a conditional basic statement of the fol-
lowing type: “If we interpret our observations at the spatio-temporal position (w, 
x, y, z) on the basis of theory T0, we come to the conclusion that a black swan 
exists there”. Consequently, to falsify a theory it is not necessary to verify an 
independent basic statement (which can be verified independently from a the-
ory), but only to verify a conditional basic statement (which can be called “veri-
fied” only if the assumption is made that the theory is verified.). 
 
The principle (and the logic behind the principle) to interpret our observations 
(or “raw data”) on the basis of the hypothesis that the theory is true (null hy-
pothesis) and then test the theory on the basis of these observations is the 
standard approach of classical statistics (as opposed to Bayesian statistics). In 
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many cases this can imply a bias in favour of the acceptance of the null hy-
pothesis. A point typically criticised by Baysians. But the Baysian proposal to 
substitute this objective bias by the subjective bias of the researcher is not a 
serious alternative. First, there are many cases where we can falsify the null 
hypothesis in spite of this bias. Second, if we think that a theory is false in spite 
of the fact that it is not falsified by empirical tests, we can construct a competing 
theory and test both theories against each other.  
 
2.2. Metaphysical assumptions necessary and sufficient to make empiri-
cal theories falsifiable 
 
To the second question: which minimal assumptions are necessary and suffi-
cient to make sure that the observations of human beings refer to something 
that actually exists in reality?  
 
First we have to assume that a reality which is independent of our conscience 
does exist (in the following “assumption of an autonomous reality”). This is the 
basic assumption of realism as opposed to all forms of idealism, which more or 
less explicitly state the contrary. The assumption of an autonomous reality is a 
synthetic statement12 that can neither verified nor falsified. It cannot be verified 
because by Humes’ induction problem, no synthetic statement can be verified. It 
cannot be falsified, because each falsifying basic statement could be interpreted 
as an indication for a kind of “higher order” realism.13 Therefore, the basic as-
sumption of realism has not the status of a scientific hypothesis but of a meta-
physical hypothesis.  
                                            
12 In terms of Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2000); Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen 
Verstand, Digitale Bibliothek Vol. 2: Philosophie, p. 18619 (Concordance: Leibniz-Abh., p. 
266), Direktmedia Publishing, Berlin. 
13 Each attempt to construct an example to prove the falsifiabilty of the basic assumption of 
realism regularly fails: One can for example argue that the hypothesis is falsified, if one 
makes the observation that reality changes according to our conscience. One such example 
could be a tree becoming a house if our conscience imagines the tree to be a house. How-
ever in this case one could defend the basic assumption of realism by claiming that in real 
reality there is no real difference between a tree and a house and so on. Popper (1972), Ob-
jective Knowledge, footnote 7, presents a similar example from the Austrian writer Marie von 
Eber-Eschenbach. Another, somewhat more sophisticated way to defend the basic assump-
tion of realism against each trial of falsification, is the hint to the fact that our observation of 
reality can change, if we use another theory to interpret our senses data. So our observation 
of reality can change even in the case that reality has not changed.  
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Second we have to assume that our senses apparatus is able to observe some 
appearances that really exist in this autonomous reality (version 1). Since this 
seems to be a far reaching assumption, it is important to note that it is equiva-
lent with the assumption that the autonomous reality is not a “foolproof para-
dise” (version 2). If an autonomous reality exists and has not the character of a 
foolproof paradise human beings (as well as other organisms) could not survive 
in this reality without their senses apparatus providing them at least a certain 
minimum degree of reliable information about reality. 
 
Of course, the second assumption too (no matter what version) can neither be 
verified nor falsified. It cannot be verified because by Humes’ induction problem, 
no synthetic statement can be verified. It cannot be falsified, because any falsi-
fying basic statement would discredit the reliability of our senses apparatus and 
hence the reliability of the basic statement itself. Therefore this assumption too 
has not the status of a scientific hypothesis but of a metaphysical hypothesis. 
 
It is also important to see that the second assumption does not mean that our 
senses apparatus is able to recognize the “true” or “absolute” reality “itself” or 
the like essentialist pretensions.14 As the above example of a falsifiable chemi-
cal theory shows, it must only be able to correctly distinguish differences be-
tween appearances in reality.  
 
In order to correctly distinguish differences between appearances in reality, our 
senses apparatus must have built-in theories about reality: To distinguish be-
tween different colours, it must have a built-in theory about certain aspects of 
the frequency spectrum of light; to distinguish between different levels of noise, 
it must have a built-in theory about certain aspects of the frequency spectrum of 
sonic waves and so on. These theories are built-in our “hardware” (e.g. the eyes 
and ears) and our “software” (i.e. the neural network that forms our conscience). 
                                            
14 This is an important differentiation: It is logically possible that our senses apparatus correctly 
detects certain aspects of reality without detecting the “absolute” or “true” nature of reality. 
This important differentiation is completely ignored by fashionable varieties of idealism as 
Luhmann (1995), Social Systems, or Rorty (1999), Truth and Progress. 
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They have not to be “true” in the sense that they must correctly explain the “true 
nature” of light or sonic waves or whatever. However they must possess a de-
gree of empirical corroboration high enough to correctly detect certain differ-
ences that exist between these appearances – at least on an ordinal scale.15 If 
our built-in theories had not this minimum degree of empirical corroboration, we 
could not survive in an autonomous reality, which is not a foolproof paradise. 
 
How do these built-in theories relate to the theories, which (like the above 
chemical theory) we invent and whose empirical hypotheses we test by our ob-
servations? It is clear that only those hypotheses are testable that relate to ap-
pearances in reality which the built-in theories of our senses apparatus are able 
to distinguish. This sounds more complicated than it is: For example in order to 
test the above chemical theory by our observations, we must be able to derive 
from this theory definitions of its universals, which make these universals ob-
servable. A theory from which we cannot derive observable definitions of its 
universals can not be empirically tested.   
 
This does however not necessarily imply that we can only test an empirical the-
ory, which relates to appearances of reality directly observable by our senses 
apparatus. It is sufficient that it is possible to derive from the theory construction 
plans for devices that transfer events in spheres of reality not directly observ-
able (e.g. the spheres of particle physics or cosmology) to spheres of reality 
observable by our senses apparatus (typically our visual sense). Examples for 
such devices are particle accelerators (particle physics) and x-ray telescopes 
(cosmology). 
 
The two minimal assumptions, which are necessary and sufficient to make sure 
that human observations refer to something that actually exists in reality, can 
both neither be verified nor falsified. Consequently, it is logically possible to as-
sume the contrary. This assumption is made by the various variants of the ideal-
ist doctrine. However it is important to recognize that this assumption too can 
neither be verified nor falsified.  
                                            
15 The emergence of organisms with well corroborated built-in theories can be explained by 
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Despite of this logical “standoff” there is a pragmatic argument in favour of the 
realist position: In everyday life everybody – even an idealist – acts as if he 
holds both realist assumptions to be true.  Stated in another way: it would be 
very dangerous to cross a busy street based on the idealist doctrine. Therefore, 
crossing a busy street most idealists behave like realists. This explains also, 
why consequent idealists are so hard to find: they typically grow not very old. In 
this sense, a realist can practise his believe, while for an idealist it is suicidal to 
practise his believe. 
                                                                                                                                
Darwinian evolutionary theory. 
